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RETURN OF THE CHANCELLOR'S
FOOT? DISCRETION IN PERMANENT
RESIDENT DEPORTATION APPEALS
UNDER THE IMMIGRA TIONA CT
BY RICHARD HAIGH* AN JIM SMITH**
This article examines recent changes to section 70 of
the Immigration Act that allow the minister of
immigration to deport Canadian permanent residents
who are determined to be a danger to the public
without proper procedural safeguards. The authors
argue that much of both current theoretical literature
on discretion and the history of the development of
discretion within the immigration scheme are against
these changes. By analyzing how discretion is
employed in other, similar, public safety regimes, the
authors show that the recent changes violate individual
rights and will very likely create more intractable
problems than those they set out to solve.
Cot article examine les changements rdcents apportds A
la section 70 de la Loi sur l'immigration. Cos
changements permettent au Ministre de l'immigration
de d~porter les r6sidents permanents du Canada, qui
sont considrs dangereux pour Ie public, sans passer
par les procedures de sauvegarde appropri6es. L'auteur
soutient que bien des arguments et du d~bat th~orique
en cours surla discrdtion et de l'histoire de la discretion
au sein du plan de l'immigration, sont contre ces
changements. En analysant comment la discretion est
utiliste dans d'autres regimes de s~curit6 publique
semblables, l'auteur d~montre que ces changements
rdcents constituent une violation des droits des
individus, et cr~era trbs probablement plus de
probl~mes insolubles quo ceux qu'ils cherchent A
r~soudre.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Within the last thirty years, two different approaches to the
exercise of discretion in deportation appeals by permanent residents
have been utilized.' Prior to 1967, the exercise of discretion was the sole
province of the minister of immigration, who could confirm, quash, or
substitute his or her own judgment for any decision by the Immigration
Appeal Board.2 After 1967, with the transformation of that Board into a
"court of record" with regard to sponsorship and removal appeals,
jurisdiction over appeals was stripped from the minister and endowed
solely in the Board itself 3 Despite numerous changes made since then,
the Immigration Appeal Board (now the Immigration and Refugee
Board-Appeal Division)4 has continued to exercise this discretionary
power. "This approach has now ended. Recent changes to the
Immigration Act introduced by Bill C-445 strip the Appeal Division of its
jurisdiction in the case of criminal deportation appeals under s. 70,
should the minister issue an "opinion" that the appellant is "a danger to
the public in Canada." 6 This pre-emption represents a partial return to
the pre-1967 state, giving the minister control over the removal arm of
the Appeal Division's jurisdiction, while preserving inviolate the Board's
exercise of discretion in sponsorship appeals.
Two questions arise from this situation. The first concerns the
preferable location and type of discretion best suited to temper the rule-
1 The changes to the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, detailed in this article affect other
persons, but the negative implications of these changes for permanent residents will perhaps be the
most acute. Similar arguments can probably also be made for Convention refugees, sponsored
relatives, and returning residents.
2 See Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 325, s. 31(4):
The Minister may in any case review the decision of an Immigration Appeal Board and
confirm or quash such decision or substitute his decision therefor as he deems just and
proper and may, for these purposes, direct that the execution of the deportation order be
stayed pending his review and decision, and the decision of the Minister on appeals dealt
with or reviewed by him or the decision of the majority of an Immigration Appeal Board
on appeals, other than those reviewed by the Minister, is final.
3 Immigration Appeal Board Act, S.C. 1966-67, c. 90, ss. 7, 11, 12. The minister retained the
residual discretionary power not to remove a person (or to arrange for their admission).
4 Unless the context requires otherwise, for simplicity both forms of this appeal tribunal will be
referred to as the Appeal Division or the iAD.
5 An Act to Amend the Immigration Act and the Citizenship Act and to make a consequential
amendment to the Customs Act, S.C. 1995, c. 15 [hereinafter Bill C-44]. The bill received royal assent
on 15 June 1995, and came into force on 10 July 1995.
6 ImmigrationAct, supra note 1, s. 70(5).
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driven nature of immigration law. Preliminary to this is the question of
what standards shall determine such a preference. Unless the minister
plans to issue an "opinion" in all criminal removal appeals, the effect of
Bill C-44 is to create two distinct classes of permanent resident under
deportation order: those about whom the minister does not exercise the
newly-regained oversight to issue an opinion (and who therefore retain a
right of appeal), and those about whom the minister does issue an
opinion (who have no right of appeal). On the face of it, the Appeal
Division appears to retain its jurisdiction in criminal removal appeals in
which the minister does not issue an opinion. However, the amendment
also allows the minister to decide that a successful appellant has later on
breached any terms and conditions of a stay and is a danger to the
public, thereby nullifying the Appeal Division's decision and again
making the person deportable.7 In a nutshell, the problem is that the
minister is endowed with a discretion to determine when the Appeal
Division may exercise its discretion in section 70 appeals. The ambit of
this discretion extends for the duration of any stay granted by the Appeal
Division; any subsequent positive discretionary decision by the Board
may be impeached, should the minister so decide.
The second question involves the additional requirements
brought about by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.8 In
1967, one of the key factors that resulted in discretionary power over
removal appeals being placed within the Board was a perception that
there was a potential for arbitrariness on the part of the minister.9 Since
that time, the Charter has come into force, imposing a whole new
standard by which to measure government action; and the law regarding
judicial review, similarly, has grown more attentive to issues of
procedural fairness and misuse of discretion. Immigration tribunals, via
the Appeal Division and its predecessor, have spent nearly three decades
developing structures to help guide the exercise of discretion in removal
appeals, which included determining the "safety and good order of
Canadian society."lO These have been set down in a well-developed set
of cases. The fate of this body of jurisprudence-much anticipated by
7 /bid. s. 70(6). See discussion in Part VII(F), below.
8 Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charter].
9 See J. Sedgwick, The SedgwickReport (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965) Part II at 8.
10 This express acknowledgement of objective 3(i) of the Immigration Act was confirmed by
the Federal Court of Appeal in Canepa v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992]
3 F.C. 270 (CA.) [hereinafter Canepa], leave to appeal refused, [1993] 1 S.C.R. v (note).
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Joseph Sedgwick in his 1965 report--is cast in doubt by the recent
legislative changes.
This article has two underlying goals: to provide a reasoned
critique of the latest legislative instalment placing discretion back with
the minister; and to defend the Appeal Division's prior control over this
same discretion as better placed to identify threats to the public. It will
be argued that, if discretion is to be exercised in deporting permanent
residents, it should be carried out within the jurisdiction of the quasi-
judicial Appeal Division, whose exercise of it is more justiciable.
Further, we argue that the current encroachment by the minister on the
Division's section 70 jurisdiction is contrary to the tenets of a developing
body of thought about discretion, and to the example set by two other
attempts to protect public safety: the national security certificate regime
under the Immigration Act, and the dangerous offender regime under
the Criminal Code.12 The article is not, however, a call to arms against
discretion in favour of rules. Underlying all of it is a belief that the
proper exercise of discretion can deliver a rational, purposive, and just
result while achieving statutory goals.
After setting out the law both prior to and after the amendments,
the article will turn to theoretical aspects of discretion, and will propose
a normative framework-owing much to the works of Kenneth Culp
Davis and Denis Galligan13-which will operate in the background as an
informal guide to where one might best locate a discretionary power.
The proposed normative criteria fall under the broad areas of
rationality, purposiveness, and justice (fairness). The article will then
raise three arguments against placing supervisory discretion in the
minister, using each of the normative criteria. The first such argument
outlines criticisms made towards a similar ministerial discretion prior to
1967, and a renewed plea for their continued relevance today. Second,
the article questions the efficiency of endowing an additional executive
scrutineer with a discretionary jurisdictional veto over a factor already
taken fully into account by the existing quasi-judicial body.' 4 Third, by
11 See Sedgwick, supra note 9, Part II at 9 (recommendation 4).
12 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, Part XXIV.
13 See K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1969); and D.J. Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
14 The minister seems to have chosen to re-endow himself with only the negative version of
the pre-1967 discretionary power, saying in effect that those who are not vetoed are left to their own
devices at the Appeal Division, but that there are some permanent residents whose appeal right
should be vetoed.
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way of a detailed examination of two other regimes, it will be
demonstrated that the nature of the discretion exercisable by the
minister is entirely out of keeping with similar "public safety" discretion
given to the executive in other situations. The conclusion makes several
observations and recommendations concerning the possible provenance
of such a flawed scheme, and what, pragmatically, might be done to help
it conform more to the norms set out. In this way, it is hoped that
exercise of discretion in these cases will be more palatable, that it will
not vary according to arbitary criteria like the length of the proverbial
"Chancellor's foot."1S
A final cautionary note should be made. In January 1998, the
Immigration Legislative Review issued its wide-ranging report on future
immigration policy and regulatory framework in Canada.1 6 The report
recommended substantial changes to virtually the entire immigration
system, including structural changes to the immigration and citizenship
branches, changes to immigrant selection criteria, and a new Protection
Act reflecting radical changes to the refugee determination system. One
of the major concerns expressed in the report was the need to alter the
exercise of discretion, by minimizing it wherever possible, and
structuring it by codifying its use in those other casesj 7 If the report is
adopted, it may dramatically affect the use of ministerial discretion, and
some of the remarks made in this article may become superfluous.
However, despite the general tenor of the report affirming natural
justice rights, including favouring the right of review in most cases, this
does not seem to be indicated in matters involving national security or
dangers to the public. Chapter 9 of the report states that landed
immigrants should be entitled to a review of deportation in every case,
unless a security certificate is issued or in the minister's opinion, they
represent a danger to the public.18 The report is silent on the actual
framework surrounding the issuance of this opinion-whether this will
15 The aphorism from which the title of this article draws its inspiration originated with John
Selden who, in the seventeenth century, described equity as "a roguish thing" measured by the
length of "the Chancellor's foot": J. Selden, The Table Talk of John Selden by S.W. Singer, 3d ed.
(London: J.R. Smith, 1860) at 148-49. Years later, Lord Eldon LC. expressed the hope that he had
done nothing "to justify the reproach that the equity of this Court varies like the Chancellor's foot":
Gee v. Pritchard (1818), 2 Swans. 402 at 414, 36 E.R. 670 at 674 (Ch.). Since then, the phrase has
become a familiar way of describing arbitrary and unstructured decisionmaking processes.
16 See Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration-Immigration Legislative
Advisory Group, Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration (Ottawa:
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1997) (Chair: R. Trempe) [hereinafter Not Just Numbers].
17 1bid. c. 10.
18 1bid. at 129 and accompanying text (Recommendation 163).
250 [VOL. 36 NO. 2
Return of the Chancellor's Foot?
be similar to the current procedure discussed in this article is unknown.
However, until such time as a new, and different, legislative scheme is
adopted, our concerns with the present system, and that proposed in the
report, remain undiminished.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
A. The Law Before Bill C-44 Came into Force (10 July 1995)
Part IV of the Immigration Act sets out the statutory basis for
claims and appeals.19 A tripartite Immigration and Refugee Board (iRB)
is established by section 57(1), which consists of the Chairperson of the
IRB and the members of the three divisions, one of which is the Appeal
Division.20 The LAD is a "court of record' 21 with sole and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear appeals made under sections 70 (removal orders), 71
(minister's appeals of an adjudicator's decision) and 77 (refusals to
approve an application for landing made by a member of the family
class). The jurisdiction of the iAD includes the power to hear and
determine all questions of law and fact, including questions of
jurisdiction.22 Within its jurisdiction, the iAD has all the powers, rights
and privileges of a superior court of record,23 including a widened
evidentiary power to consider evidence it finds credible or trustworthy
and necessary for dealing with the subject-matter before it.24 Rules of
practice and procedure may be set by the chairperson of the IRB subject
to the approval of the Governor in Council.25 The LAD must provide
written reasons for its decision on request.26
19 Immigration Act,supra note 1, ss. 57-84. See also, D. Mullan, "Administrative Tribunals:
Their Evolution in Canada from 1945 to 1984" in I. Bernier & A. Lajoie, eds., Regulations, Crown
Corporations and Administrative Tribunals (Research Study 48) (Ottawa: Royal Commission on the
Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, 1985) 155.
20 Immigration Act, supra note 1, s. 57(2).
21 Ibid. s. 69.4(1).
22 Ibid. s. 69.4(2).
23 Ibid. s. 69.4(3).
2 4 Ibid. s. 69.4(3)(c).
25 Ibid. ss. 65, 79, 80.
2 6 Ibid. s. 69.4(5).
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Permanent residents2 7 who are subject to a removal order or
conditional removal order are granted rights of appeal under section 70
of the Act. Those whose removal has already taken place may appeal,
and be allowed under terms and conditions to return to appear in person
at their appeal?8 The person may, subject to certain exceptions set out
in section 70(4), appeal on either or both of the grounds of (i) questions
of law or fact, or mixed law and fact; or (ii) that having regard to all the
circumstances of the case29 the person should not be removed from
Canada.30 The exceptions in section 70(4) limit the grounds of appeal to
questions of law, fact, or mixed law and fact for specified persons:
subjects of a national security certificate issued under section 40(1), or
those whom an adjudicator has determined to be members of an
inadmissible class described in section 19(1), which includes organized
crime, criminal conspiracy, terrorism, danger to the security of Canada,
war criminal or perpetrators of crimes against humanity, or senior
member of a government involved in terrorism. Where a permanent
resident appeals a removal order, the lAD may order the inquiry to be
reopened in order for the adjudicator to receive additional evidence or
testimony;31 in such a case, a transcript and assessment must be supplied
by the adjudicator to the LAD for its consideration. 32
The iAD may dispose of an appeal by allowing it, dismissing it or,
if it is made pursuant to section 70(1)(b), by directing a stay of execution
of the order33 under such terms and conditions as the IAD may
determine.34 The case may be reviewed from time to time if the IAD
considers it necessary or advisable 35 and the terms and conditions may
27 The specific focus of this article is permanent residents; others who may appeal are
Convention refugees, sponsors and those in possession of a valid returning resident permit.
2 8 Immigration.Act, supra note 1, s. 75.
29 This is what has been described as the "equitable" jurisdiction of the iAD. If a removal
order is validly issued to the person whose identity has been established, all that remains is this
discretionary ground. Almost all appeals are concentrated on this ground. See also R.P. Cohen,
"Fundamental (In)justice: The Deportation of Long-term Residents From Canada" (1994) 32
Osgoode Hall LJ. 457.
30 Immigration.Act, supra note 1, s. 70(1)(a), (b).
3 1 Ibid. s. 72(1).
3 2 Ibid. s. 72(2).
3 3 Ibid. s. 73(1)(c).
3 4 Ibid. s. 74(2).
35 Ibid. s. 74(2).
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be amended at any time.36 The iAD may cancel the stay at any time and
dismiss the appeal, directing that the removal order be executed.37
Any decision by the LAD is subject to an application for judicial
review, with leave, to the Federal Court (Trial Division),38 which must
be filed within fifteen days3 9 If leave is granted, the judgment is subject
to appeal only if the court has certified and stated a serious question of
general importance arising from the case.40
B. The LawAfter Bill C-44
The Bill C-44 amendments, which came into force on 10 July
1995,41 radically limit who may avail themselves of the process described
above. A limited right of appeal (on fact, law, or mixed fact and law
only) is preserved for permanent residents with respect to whom a
national security certificate has been issued but who are not described by
the new section 70(5).42 Similarly, certain of the adjudicator-determined
inadmissible classes retain the same limited right of appeal-terrorists,
war criminals, perpetrators of crimes against humanity, and members of
terrorist governments. 43 Three classes from the formerly inadmissible
list-organized crime, criminal conspiracy, and threats to the security of
Canada-have had their limited appeal rights removed.44 Organized
crime and criminal conspiracy now appear in the proscribed list of the
new section 70(5); in contrast, those who pose threats to the security of
36 Ibid. s. 74(3)(a).
3 7 Ibid. s. 74(3)(b).
38 Ibid. s. 82.1(1).
3 9 Ibid. s. 82.1(3).
40 Ibid. s. 83(1).
4 1 Bill C-44 contained a contentious "retroactivity" provision that is at the time of this writing
being fought out in a number of iAD cases. The minister is contending that for any appeal which has
not been decided on the coming into force of the amendments, an opinion may be issued and the
jurisdiction of the iAD to hear the appeal may be removed. It seems that this argument is winning:
in Tsang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1997), 211 N.R. 131 (F.C.A.), aff'g
(1996), F.T.R. 214 (F.C.T.D.), the court held that the retrospective provisions of the new
Immigration Act do apply, and, once an opinion is issued, terminate the jurisdiction of the iAD.
Fascinating and disturbing as this issue is, it is beyond the ambit of this article to comment upon it in
detail.
42 Immigration Act, supra note 1, s. 70(4)(a).
43 Ibid. s. 70(4)(b).
4 4 Ibid. s. 70(4)(b).
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Canada4S have simply dropped from sight in the new section 70(4) and
thus have presumably lost their right to appeal their removal (although it
was never clear how someone could fall exclusively within this category,
so the practical effect is probably non-existent).
The major change introduced by Bill C-44 is the loss of the right
of appeal to the IAD for a number of classes of person against whom a
deportation order or conditional deportation order has been made.46
The right of appeal is removed by the issuance of an opinion by the
minister that the person constitutes a danger to the public in Canada.47
The only condition precedent beyond the existence of a deportation
order for this opinion is that the person must have been determined by
an adjudicator to be a member of one of the following classes:
• persons convicted in Canada of an offence that may be punishable by a
maximum term of ten years or more;48
• persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe have been
convicted of a similar offence outside Canada;49
• persons who have committed an act or omission outside Canada that
would attract a similar maximum term;50 '
- persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe are or were
members of organized crime outside Canada;S1
• persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe will commit one
or more indictable offences;52
- persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe will commit acts
of indictable criminal conspiracy;S 3
- permanent residents who in the opinion of an immigration officer or
peace officer, based on a balance of probabilities, have committed an act
or omission elsewhere which would attract a maximum sentence of ten
years or more if committed in Canada;5 4 and
45 bid. s. 19(1)(k).
46 Ibid. s. 70(5).
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid. s. 19(1)(c).
49 Ibid. ss. 19(1)(e.1)(i) or 27(1)(a.1)(i).
50 Ibid. s. 19(1)(c.1)(ii).
51 Ibid. s. 19(1)(c.2).
52 Ibid. s. 19(1)(d)(i).
53 Ibid. s. 19(1)(d)(ii).
54 kbid. s. 27(1)(a.1)(ii).
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- persons convicted under any Act of Parliament for an offence for
which a term of ten years or more may be imposed.55
Whereas section 70(5) operates to remove a right of appeal from
the specified classes, either pre-emptively or on an attempt to file an
appeal,5 6 section 70(6) deals with appeals that have already been
decided by the IAD and a stay imposed on terms and conditions.
Affecting the same classes of persons, the section declares that a stay
against the execution of a deportation order will be of no force and
effect if the minister issues an opinion that the person has breached the
terms and conditions of the stay and that the person is a danger to the
public in Canada. The section also specifies that when the stay becomes
of no force and effect due to the minister's opinion, the IAD may not
review the case notwithstanding the provision to do so in section 74(2).
The general provision for judicial review in section 82.1(1) is
applicable to the new procedure. Leave is required,5 7 application must
be made within fifteen days after the person has been notified of the
decision,58 and there is no appeal of a denial of leave.59
Perhaps most telling about the amendments is the clear
demarcation between what may be called political crimes and what are
true crimes. The amendments preserve all existing appeal rights for
those under order of removal for alleged political crime, while stripping
away all such rights from those involved in true crimes. The difference
in procedures for those reported as "politically" removable, and those
criminal classes which are the subject of Bill C-44, is dealt with at length
in Part VI, below. This distinction is largely specious, given the nature of
the presumed component acts.
55 Ibid. s. 27(1)(d), as modified by s. 70(5)(c).
56 The triggering event for issuing an opinion is not specified in the amended legislation. One
theory is that on filing an appeal with an immigration officer, a decision is taken as to whether an
opinion should be issued. The matter is still obscure. In a private conversation with an ]AD
member, hope was expressed that an opinion would issue in such a fashion, but ultimately there is
no way of knowing until the Appeals Officer tendered it: interview with an IRB-AD member,
(Toronto, 21 March 1996). The person asked that his or her name not be used.
57 1mmigration Act, supra note 1, s. 82.1(1).
58 Ibid. s. 82.1(3).
59 Ibid. s. 82.2.
1998]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
III. POSITING AN EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK
A. Preliminary Matters: Discretion Under the Immigration Act
The Immigration Act is, essentially, a great cobbled-together mass
of rules and prohibitions on who may come to Canada and, once here,
who may remain, and under what terms. However, particularly since the
seminal work of Kenneth Culp Davis, 60 it is equally possible to see the
Act as a compendium of discretionary powers distributed among various
governmental actors. For the present purposes, it is sufficient to identify
the two locations of positive discretion which can be exercised when a
permanent resident is in contravention of the statute and subject to a
removal order. The first site is at the LAD, which may grant an appeal of
a deportation order "on the ground that, having regard to all the
circumstances of the case, the person should not be removed from
Canada."61 The second, which operates throughout the Act as a
"manumission," is through direct application to the minister on
compassionate or humanitarian grounds.6 2 More will be said below
about the effect of the change in location of one discretion on the
availability of the other.
In effect, what has been created is a new, negative discretion on
the part of the minister to remove a positive discretion from an
independent quasi-judicial body. This negative discretion is exercisable
against permanent residents, ironically the only class other than
Canadian citizens to be accorded a right, albeit qualified, to come into
and remain in the country.63
Prior to analyzing the details of the amendments, it is first
necessary to gain an understanding of how discretion works, how it
should work, and whether and in what form it does (or does not) work.64
60 Supra note 13. The pioneering work of Davis underlies much of this analysis. Although
subsequent theorists have found much to argue with in terms of how to go about it, his
premise-that structuring discretion is preferable to raw, untreated, discretion-is compelling.
61 Immigration Act, supra note 1, s. 70(1)(b). Although a statutorily created discretion,
"equitable jurisdiction" has come to be a synonym for this discretion. The two terms will be used
interchangeably in this article.
62 Ibid. s. 114(2).
63 Ibid. ss. 4(1), (2).
64 For a good overview of this concept, see Davis, supra note 13; and Galligan, supra, note 13.
Other useful studies include R. Baldwin, Rules and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995);
and K. Hawkins, ed., The Uses of Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
[VOL. 36 No. 2
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The "flow downwards" from the executive-with a few notable
exceptions6 S-has been taken as the natural course of events. This is
understandable in that we live in a world of ever-increasing delegated
discretionary power; as such there has been little concern with analyzing
discretionary power seized back by the delegator. Denis Galligan has
described the most typical structural separation:
Typically, the legislature sets the objectives ... and then leaves implementation to
administrative bodies. The latter settle the more specific policies and strategies within the
defined area, and work out their application in actual cases. The lines of accountability for
each are different. The legislature is the creature of the electoral process, and accountable
to it; the administration is the creature of the legislature, and while the former is
accountable in various ways to the latter, the administration acquires a certain
independence and autonomy from the legislature.6 6
Definitions of discretion are various, but usually centre around two
essentials: choice between allowable alternatives and the relative
autonomy of the decisionmaker. 67
B. Constructing an Evaluative Framework
The easiest way to evaluate a revised discretionary apportionment
might be to investigate what could be termed its "negative capability." Is
the procedure no less fair than its predecessor? No less efficient? No
less in conformity with the Charter? No less in conformity with policy
goals? If the revisions are equal or better than the former regime, there
should be little to complain about.
While such questions do underlie much of what follows, existing
theories about the manner of exercising discretion can also be used to
assess the ideal place for its exercise. The decision about where to locate
discretion-in the minister or in the IAD-iS in itself an archetypal
discretionary decision. As such, criteria used to evaluate how discretion
is best exercised can be used to structure (in the classic Davis sense) an
65 John Evans, in one of the few works that attempts to examine factors which might impede
the devolution of discretionary power from the executive to an appellate structure, identifies several
procedural fairness problems to be encountered in administering substantively unjust rules, as well
as "cost" factors that are impediments to a smooth downward flow. See J. M. Evans, Immigration
Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983) c. 7 at 354ff.
6 6 Supra note 13 at 232-33.
67 Such definitions include "an express grant of power conferred on officials where
determination of the standards according to which power is to be exercised is left largely to them":
ibid. at 1; or, "A positive way of conferring powers where it is important that officials have more
freedom as to the way they are to be exercised than a detailed set of rules might allow": ibid. at 2.
1998]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 36 NO. 2
assessment of the wisdom of placing the discretionary power at a
particular site. Galligan's evaluative framework of rationality,
purposiveness and morality68 is in many ways the most useful in the
instant case, given the resonance between the standards he sets and the
principles underlying the Supreme Court of Canada's test for justifying
Charter infringements. 69
1. Rationality
In its simplest sense, rationality concerns the explicability and
openness of an action or decision. A process that is not open and
explicable to some degree may well satisfy the decisionmaker, but is
unlikely to satisfy an unsuccessful interested party. Openness is
important in order to legitimate decisionmaking, to ensure that each
person's, group's, and community's stake in a particular outcome is
clear.7 0  Given a high individual interest in the outcome of a
discretionary decision, an inexplicable exercise of discretionary power
may well attract accusations of bias, arbitrariness, discrimination,
irrationality, fettering or unreasonableness. As Keith Hawkins has
pointed out, a lack of openness also does a potential disservice to the
decisionmaker:
68 bid. at 4-5:
The most rudimentary requirements of political morality are that in exercising
discretionary powers, officials should comply with standards of rationality, purposiveness
and morality; from these, more specific legal principles of accountability can be
developed. They are not, however, very precise concepts, nor are they very easily
separated from each other.
69 There is, of course, no direct correspondence between the standards developed by the
British academic Denis Galligan in his 1986 work and the continuously evolving s. 1 Charter
jurisprudence first developed in R v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. However, resonance between
Galligan's criteria-rationality, purposiveness, morality-and the second, proportionality, stage of
the Oakes test-rational connection, minimal impairment, deleterious effect weighed against
importance of objective-are both aspects of shared societal values that necessarily come into play
when individual interests conflict with government policy goals. See also, A. Lamer, "The Rule of
Law and Judicial Independence: Protecting Core Values in Times of Change" (1996) 45 U.N.B.L.J.
3; and P. McCormick, "TIle Supreme Court Cites the Supreme Court: Follow-up Citation on the
Supreme Court of Canada, 1989-93" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall UJ. 453.
70 See L. Sossin, "Redistributing Democracy: An Inquiry into Authority, Discretion and the
Possibility of Engagement in the Welfare State" (1994) 26 Ottawa L Rev 1 at 35. See also, M.
Priest, "Structure and Accountability of Administrative Agencies" in Law Society of Upper Canada,
Administrative Law: Principles, Practice and PluralismlSpecial Lectures of the Law Society of Upper
Canada, 1992 (Toronto: Carswell, 1993) 11 [hereinafter Lsuc].
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[Ihe procedures by which discretion is exercised prompt concern. Decision-makers are
free to take into account a wide array of information, which may be of questionable
accuracy, reliability or relevance. This concern becomes the greater when discretion is
exercised in private. Privacy not only obstructs the possibility of review and the general
accountability of decision-makers; it also leads to a lack of understanding about how
decisions are made, not only by those who are the subject of discretion, but also by those
who decide. 71
Openness is manifested through, among others, prior notice, the chance
to lead and/or test evidence or some form of participation rights, and the
rendering of reasons for a decision.72 It is not simple coincidence that
explicability, as well, underlies the first stage of the proportionality test
for justification of Charter violations---"rational connection." Ameasure
adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective, not based
on arbitrary, unfair, or irrational considerations.73
Careful design, in terms of an appropriate relocation of discretion
in the immigration appellate context, was the subject of much of the
deliberations of Parliament in 1967.74 In order to avoid the possibility of
arbitrary, unfair, or capricious exercises of discretion, it was decided to
remove all discretion from the minister's control. The absence of a
clear, rational connection between the perceived threat and the resulting
reinstatement of ministerial control in the Immigration Act's current
guise, undercuts what might be legitimate policy concerns.
2. Purposiveness
There should be a valid purpose for relocating discretion. This
helps to situate the decision in a rational context, and also insulates it
from claims of arbitrariness. Galligan observes that "[a]ny exercise of
official power should be capable of being explained in terms of its
purposes and within a framework of constraining principles."75 Some of
the more likely reasons for altering the locus of discretion in an
71 K. Hawkins, "The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives from Law and Social Science" in
Hawkins, ed., supra note 64, 11 at 16.
72 While there is no general common law duty to give reasons, a number of compelling
arguments can be made for their articulation: see J. M. Evans et al.,Administrative Law: Cases, Te:4
and Materials, 4th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1995) at 479-80 and, generally c. 6; see also,
generally, R. Dussault & L Borgeat,Administrative Law: A Treatise, 2d ed., vol. 4, trans. D. Breen
(Toronto: Carswell, 1990); and D.J. Mullan, Administrative Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996).
73 See Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Empoloyees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 at 291.
74 See Part IV, below.
75 Supra note 13 at 20.
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administrative context include: efficiency and effectiveness, the ability to
take into account all relevant interests and avoid irrelevant factors, and
the ability to predict future outcomes from past decisions. In sum, a
common objective is to attain a high degree of continuity and
consistency. Central to the concept of purposiveness is the notion of
justiciability: does the exercise of discretion raise issues suited to an
adversarial, evidence-testing process, or does the discretion turn on
issues more broadly based and political in nature, affecting numbers of
people equally? If it is the latter, the discretion more clearly lies in the
realm of the executive. Discretion capable of being structured, in which
evidence might be led and assessed in order to satisfy ascertainable
criteria, where findings of fact are produced which pertain to the
exercise of the discretion, is more suited to a judicial (or quasi-judicial)
arena.
The likelihood of structuring a discretionary power should also be
a determining factor in considering the best location for that discretion.
It is much more likely that an independent, quasi-judicial administrative
agency-relying on evidence from individual parties in conflict, and
rendering a decision between those conflicting interests-will be
structured in a manner that also enables it to make decisions on how to
effectively exercise discretion. In contrast, a minister-whose political
and policy decisions are probably incapable of testing or proof-would
generally have less need for a comparably detailed structure. 76
The second stage of the Oakes proportionality test considers
whether an action impairs as little as possible the right or freedom
involved.77 It is unlikely that a provision formed on the basis of a single
purpose, such as efficiency, will minimally impair a competing interest.
The better solution is to advert to the complexity of decisionmaking and
formulate policy in a rational way with this in mind. In the case of
discretion, the existence of structural guidelines might provide at least a
prima facie argument that thought has been given to various competing
interests.
In the last thirty years, in exercising their discretion, the IAD has
developed guidelines that consider the public safety goal that is now
central to the minister's new powers. Replacing guidelines that assist
76 See P. Anisman, "Book Review: Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry by K. C.
Davis" (1969) 47 Can. Bar Rev. 670 at 675. See also, R.S. Abella, "Canadian Administrative
Tribunals: Towards Judicialization or Dejudicialization?" (1989) 2 Can. J. Admin. L & P. 1; and S.
Scott, "The Continuing Debate Over the Independence of Regulatory Tribunals" in LSUC, supra
note 70,79.
77 See Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
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with measuring competing interests, with a single, unassessable standard
would seem to ignore, let alone minimally impair, the interests of an
individual facing deportation.
3. Morality
The third Galligan criterion is in many ways the hardest both to
assess and fulfil. Under the general rubric of "morality," Galligan
includes notions of procedural and substantive fairness, and balancing
individual interests with official ones: "Perhaps the most basic moral
principle ... is that the rights and interests of individuals be treated with
understanding and respect; from this more specific principles, including
ideas of fairness, both in substance and procedure, and
non-discrimination, may be generated." 78
This final method of quality control over discretion is the arena in
which the battle for individuated justice is fought. The previous two
criteria are value neutral-a discretionary power could be openly
exercised, notice served, evidence led, reasons given, and purpose fully
linked and effectively and efficiently exercised-with no guarantee that
an individually just result will occur. The morality criterion exists to
ensure a proper outcome is reached. It is the reason that the equitable
powers were placed and made immune from ministerial interference in
the Appeal Board in 1967. It is also under this head that the potential
for review of the decision and Charter scrutiny arises.
The final section of the Oakes proportionality test weighs the
ascertained deleterious effect on an identified individual interest against
the importance of the government objective. To satisfy this portion of
the test, the government needs to show that the measures infringing on
an interest allow for due consideration of that interest and its violation,
and that the measures taken satisfy, in some nominal way at least, the
basic principles of natural justice. In theory, this establishes a court of
morality that reviews whether a government goal was followed blindly,
oblivious to the interest being infringed.
Were it still the era of the Singh Supreme Court,7 9 it might be
worthwhile to remount arguments for section-7-Charter scrutiny of the
78 Supra note 13 at 5.
79 See Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, which
expanded dramatically the requirements of procedural fairness imposed on the refugee
determination process under s. 7 of the Charter.
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alterations to the deportation scheme. 80 A plausible case could be made
that the automatic (in some cases only) issuance of a minister's opinion
superadded upon a previously completed (or in process) criminal
conviction, resulting in a penalty (withdrawal of appeal rights) is a
violation not just of section 7 but also sections 11(d) and (h), section 12
and, arguably, section 15 of the Charter. However, Chiarelli v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration)8 1 signified an era of
diminished expectations in the field of immigration, removals, and the
rights and interests of non-citizens.
A permanent resident facing deportation has a legitimate claim to
certain rights and interests. These include: qualified statutory right to
remain in the country; possible property interests; livelihood or
employment in the country; the impact upon character and reputation
(particularly if deportation is considered a stand-alone stigma, outside of
the criminal conviction which might or might not be a factor giving rise
to it); and other justifiable expectations developed by simply spending
time in a country. Many or most of these call for equitable
consideration, and should at least necessitate a regime that allows them
to be weighed against the legitimate interests of the state. These
concerns would seem to be borne out by the placement, confinement
and structuring of ministerial discretion in related public safety regimes,
which will be addressed in Part VI, below. The next part examines the
thirty year history leading up to Bill C-44.
IV. A HISTORICAL CRITIQUE OF MINISTERIAL DISCRETION
What the minister has reacquired in the newly-amended
Immigration Act is basically a revised version of a power held prior to
1967. It is the timing of the exercise of discretion that has changed.
Rather than awkwardly overruling certain decisions already made by the
appellate body, the minister is now able to preemptively prevent that
body from possibly making a "wrong" decision. By issuing an opinion,
the minister effectively removes the appellate body's jurisdiction. It is
safe to presume that the minister will not always be of the opinion that
potential section 70 appellants will be a danger to the public; if that were
80 These arguments have been made from a number of different perspectives. See J. M.
Evans, "The Principles of Fundamental Justice: The Constitution and the Common Law" (1991) 29
Osgoode Hall L.J. 51; Cohen, supra note 29; and F.P. Eliadis, "The Swing From Singh: The
Narrowing Application of the Charter in Immigration Law" (1995), 26 Imm. L.R. (2d) 130.
81 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711 [hereinafter Chiarelli].
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so, the amendments could have just as easily removed section 70
jurisdiction from the Appeal Division altogether.
What is left then, is essentially the situation that existed prior to
1967 with respect to certain classes of individual. Our analysis is made
easier by the existence of previous criticisms of this form of
arrangement. Four sources are pertinent: the two Sedgwick reports
(1965),82 the minister of immigration's White Paper on Immigration,83
and the House of Commons debates in February-March 196784
surrounding the reconstitution of the Immigration Appeal Board. Each
of these is discussed. Underpinning the discussion is the central
question: if it was the correct decision to surrender discretion to an
independent body in 1967, what convincing reasons can be mustered for
taking it back in the late 1990s?
A. The Sedgwick Reports (1965)
The grant to the minister of absolute discretion regarding
deportation appeals in the earlier Immigration Acts was definitive.85 He
or she could review the Immigration Appeal Board's decisions and
confirm, quash or substitute it with his or her own decision, directing a
stay of execution of the deportation order if necessary.s6 There was no
indication of what circumstances could prompt a review, nor of what
considerations might be taken into account in assessing the Board's
decision and coming to a decision. By leaving both these questions
open, the process was compromised, as Sedgwick made plain:
1. To make appeals to the Board subject to review and final determination by the
Minister is to render the Board essentially sterile. If the Board's decision is unfavourable,
recourse to the Minister is almost automatic in a great proportion of cases and the Board
is reduced toa mere stepping stone between the Special Inquiry Officer and the Minister.
82 Sedgwick, supra note 9.
83 Canada, Department of Manpower and Immigration, Canadian Immigration Policy, 1966:
White Paper on Immigration (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966) [hereinafter White Paper].
84 Canada, House of Commons, Debates and Proceedings, 1st Sess., 27th Par]. [hereinafter
H.C. Debates]. The debates occurred over a number of days and can be found as follows: vol. XII"
(20 February 1967) at 13267-70; (21 February 1967) at 13280-328; vol. XIII (22 February 1967) at
13375-90; (27 February 1967) at 13502-10; and (1 March 1967) at 13626-41.
85 Tle first use of this absolute discretion was contemplated in the Immigration Act, S.C. 1906,
c. 93, s. 33; it remained thus until 1967: see, for example, supra note 2, for text of the relevant
provision of the 1952 Immigration Act.
8 6 Supra note 2.
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2. [Granting finality to Board decisions] would relieve the Minister of a great deal of
pressure of an undesirable nature. My inquiry satisfies me that the pressures brought to
bear have often dictated the disposition of cases.
8 7
Sedgwick also recommended, not unrelatedly, that the Appeal Board be
made truly independent.88
Apparent even from Sedgwick's understated prose is a picture of
how appellate matters were carried out from 1952 until 1967. Those
with the resources and connections would, unless they received a
favourable decision at the Appeal Board, bring as much pressure as
possible to bear on the minister. Those who managed to bully, bribe or
entice the minister sufficiently would see the denial of their appeal
struck down. The Commons debates record that some lawyers had
taken to refusing to make submissions at the Appeal Board at all,
instead merely declaring that they would wait and take the matter up
with the minister.89 All of this was conducted in secrecy, except when
the media decided to take up the cause of potential deportees, as they
did with a number of Greek ship deserters in the mid-1960s.90
B. The White Paper on Immigration (1966)
The massive task of expanding and updating the 1952 Immigration
Act had been under way for some time by the publication of the
Sedgwick reports. In 1966, the minister of immigration, Jean Marchand,
released his White Paper to outline the status of the project. Particularly
relevant, seen from today, are the minister's comments on the nature of
deportation:
84. The procedures leading to an order of deportation, involving arrest, detention and
inquiry, are inseparable from any law enforcement activity. Forjustice to be done, however, it
must be seen to be done. For this reason some procedural improvements seem desirable,
apart atogetherfrom the creation of a new appeals system on which legislation already has
been introduced in Parliament. 91
87 Sedgwick, supra note 9, Part II at 8.
88 bid. at9.
89 H. C. Debates, supra note 84.
90 This particular outcry resulted finally in the appointment of Mr. Sedgwick in 1964 to study
first the particular cases, then the relation of the minister to the Appeal Board. See Sedgwick, supra
note 9, Part I at 1.
91 Wite Paper, supra note 83 at 33-34 [emphasis added].
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The value placed on justice being seen to be done is evident in the
fulsome adversarial processes available under a revamping of appeal
rights. The minister discussed alternatives to deportation 92 but
concluded that none of them was applicable, as long as the deportation
itself consists of a fair hearing and a right of appeal. 93 This places
deportation within an administrative framework requiring at least some
level of procedural fairness-a "fair hearing" and "justice seen to be
done"-which, by predating the notion of procedural fairness in most
other administrative matters, is a sure sign of the gravity with which
forcible banishment from Canada was viewed at that time. This spirit
was borne out in the attempt to provide an appeal process guaranteeing
individual protection by allowing for an independent court of record to
arbitrate.
After outlining the limitations of the old Immigration Appeal
Board, the minister then deplored the lack of independence produced by
ministerial oversight, pointing out the general unhappiness with the
situation:
The public has become aware of this [lack of independence of decisionmaking] and of the
fact that the Board's view may be reversed by the Minister.... The Department in effect
decides the outcome of appeals against the actions of its own officers. This is the
unavoidable fact under the present Act; those charged with enforcing the Act have been
no happier with the appeals system than the public.94
Key factors to note here are the stark conclusion regarding lack of
independence, and the nemo judex implication arising when the minister
may personally reconfirm, by denying an appeal, that a deportation
order in his or her name was justified and would be carried out.9S
The White Paper went on to provide assurance that the problems
regarding deportation appeals will be solved by the proposed new
agency. That new Board, it urged
will have authority to deal conclusively in all respects with an appeal against any Order of
Deportation. ... The Board's jurisdiction will otherwise be limited only by the right to
appeal itsdecisions on questions of law to the Supreme Court of Canadawith leave of that
92 Ibid. at 35. Among the options under consideration were fines or jail sentences.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid. (para. 91).
95 It should be noted that the concern at the time, regarding the Greek ship-jumper cases, was
the failure of the minister to exercise a positive discretion in favour of the appellants. The concern
expressed in some quarters, which gave rise to the current situation, is, of course, exactly the
opposite-that the Appeal Division has allowed too many potential deportees to stay in Canada.
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court. ... The Minister will have no discretionaty authoity to act in place of the Board or to
upset its decisions.
9 6
This becomes particularly relevant in discussing the contention that the
Appeal Division has, since 1967, expended a great deal of time and
judicial consideration in these matters and become adept at doing so. If
it is now crucial for the minister to have exclusive jurisdiction over
determining potential dangers to the public, by having the power to
circumvent stays against a deportation order, convincing arguments are
needed to show the flaws in the old process.
C. Commons Debates: Immigration Appeal Board Act (1967)
Almost all of Sedgwick's 1965 recommendations, and the content
of Minister Marchand's 1966 report, were implemented in the
Immigration Appeal Board Act in 1967.97 The minister was stripped of
discretionary oversight of appeals. The Board itself was immunized
from interference by making it a court of record operating under seal,
and when faced with a legal deportation order, able to exercise its
discretion after considering all the circumstances of the case.
John Munro, parliamentary secretary to Minister Marchand,
introduced second reading of the Bill with an explanation that although
a non-citizen's presence in Canada is a privilege and not a right, once in
Canada, that person "should not be deported without a right of
appeal."98 He then repeated the Minister's earlier observation on the
Board's lack of independence and the department's appearing to be the
judge in its own case:
In these circumstances, the effectiveness of the existing board is extremely limited. The
public is aware of the board's limitations. Everyone knows that its decisions may be
reversed by the minister .... Thus the board has no independent status. It is regarded as
merely an arm of the immigration division which appears, in effect, to decide the outcome of
appeals against the actions of its own officers. This casts doubt on the application of other
aspects of immigration law, policy, and procedure.99
96 White Paper, supra note 83 at 35, para. 92 [emphasis added].
97 Supra note 3. Interestingly, in 1967 the Wilson Committee Report in England led to the
creation in 1969 of an independent, quasi-judicial appeal tribunal of similar purpose-for the first
time in the United Kingdom since the First World War.
98 H.C. Debates, supra note 84 (20 February 1967) at 13268.
9 9 Ibid. [emphasis added].
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In the ensuing debate, it was widely perceived that the former Appeal
Board had its problems. 0 Former Immigration Minister Tremblay
stated that "it is not enough for the minister to make a fair decision, his
decision must also seem fair,"101 echoing the need for procedural
protections and true independence from the department. There was
exceptionally wide consensus within and beyond the Liberal government
members on the inappropriateness of ministerial interference in "what
always should have been an area of either judicial or quasi-judicial
decision."102
Interestingly enough, there was strong resistance to giving up all
ministerial discretion (as had also been expressed earlier in the White
Paper). There was thus little objection to the minister retaining a
residual positive discretion to allow people into Canada who were in
contravention of the statute, at any point in the process.103 This residual
positive discretion still survives,10 4 but operates independently of the
appeal process. As an exercise of executive discretion resembling the
royal prerogative of mercy, even in the unlikely event that it would be
employed for an unsuccessful section 70 appellant at the Appeal
Division, it would presumably not constitute a challenge to the Division's
jurisdiction.
D. Summary Observations
Among the most attractive aspects of the reasoning that took
place in the lead up to the 1967 legislative changes are (i) a prescient
understanding of the need to accord heightened procedural fairness
requirements to an administrative process;105 and (ii) the recognition
1 0 0 Ibid. (21 February 1967) at 13280-13325.
101 Ibid. at 13293. Unhappily, his further comment, at 13295, that the new bill "meets a need
... felt by all ministers of immigration ... to unload themselves as much as possible of their discretion
on an organization of officials or commissioners where no criticism could be made" indicates that
the values of independence and fairness were grounded as well in political pragmatism.
102 Ibid. at 13297 (G. W. Baldwin (Peace River)).
103 Ibid.
104 See Immigration Act, supra note 1, s. 114(2). See also s. 37 (provisions for minister's
permits).
105 This clear legislative call for procedural "fairness" in 1967 predated by over a decade the
first of the "trilogy" of Supreme Court decisions which marked what one commentator has termed
the "advent of 'fairness' in Canadian administrative doctrine": M. Eberts, "Section 7 of the Charter
Plus Natural Justice: An Administrative Justice Section 11?" in N.R. Finkelstein & B.M. Rogers,
eds., Administrative Tribunals and the Charter (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) 101 at 102. The cases were:
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that some procedural rights are required even for non-citizens in
Canada. This vision was motivated by a clear sense of the tension
between individual interests and government policy.
Despite a measure of political pragmatism in any major legislative
change, it is quite clear that the legislative intent in removing discretion
from the executive level and placing it in a statutorily independent quasi-
judicial body was to achieve a process that was procedurally fair to the
appellant. The form envisioned for this procedure was a judicial-type
hearing, in which a person under a valid deportation order could raise
any circumstances-which previously would have been raised with the
minister-to try to obtain a favourable discretionary decision.
Procedural fairness was important in this instance, as, although not a
citizen, anyone residing in Canada merited a certain level of appeal
before being stripped of this privilege. An overriding concern, expressed
in both the White Paper and in Commons debates, was that justice and
fairness being done was not enough, but that they had to be seen by the
public to be done. Ministerial interference in appeals was arbitrary, and
allowing a minister to sit in judgement over decisions made by his or her
own department, could bring the rest of the immigration system into
disrepute. The best solution was to prescribe open decisionmaking
based on an independent quasi-judicial body, hearing all the
circumstances of an appellant's case, immunized from interference by
the executive but subject to appeal if necessary.
The concerns expressed in the 1960s mirror almost exactly the
current concerns about the vesting of discretion in the minister. The
new amendments allow the minister to produce an opinion which
prevents the Appeal Division from hearing an appeal of a decision to
deport taken in the name of that same minister. Ministerial oversight
was considered an intrusion on, and compromise of, the Appeal
Division's independence in the past, and should be construed as no less
so now.106
This particular issue is currently the subject of contention in a
series of cases generated by the transitional provisions of Bill C-44,1o7
Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commissioners Board, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311;
Martineau v. Matsqui Disciplinay Board, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602 [hereinafter Martineau]; and Cardinalv.
Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643 [hereinafter Cardinal].
1 06 The Law Reform Commission of Canada, writing a decade after the White Paper, felt safe
enough to declare that it was "obvious" that "any tribunal exercising adjudicative powers in cases
where the Department is a party must be seen to be dealing with the Department at 'arms-length":
Law Reform Commission of Canada, The Immigration Appeal Board: A Study Prepared for the Law
Reform Commission of Canada by I.A. Hunter (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada,
1976) at.65 [hereinafter Immigration Appeal Board].
1 0 7 Supra note 5, ss. 26-27.
[VOL. 36 NO. 2
Return of the Chancellor's Foot?
which allow for a certain amount of retroactivity of the opinion where an
appeal had been filed or heard but not decided at the date the
amendments came into force. The Appeal Division contends that in
such a process, the minister "is acting both as a party to a cause and the
judge of that cause."1 08 It can hardly be argued that the grant of
jurisdiction to the Appeal Division over section 70 appeals, which would
now be entering its fourth decade, was a mistake, since the new
ministerial oversight is only exercised at the discretion of the minister,
not universally. As will be shown below, no cogent argument can be
made that the Appeal Division has continually failed to ask itself the
relevant questions about danger to the public in Canada, necessitating
the minister to step in and ask it of himself or herself.
Although much has changed in the intervening thirty years,
"hands-on" ministerial oversight on a case by case basis to prevent
appeals by those considered "dangers to the public" still denies a review
by an independent agency on the merits. If ministerial interference in a
deportation order smacked of nemo judex to then-Minister Jean
Marchand, then the current minister rendering an opinion in order to
ensure the Appeal Division does not stay a deportation order should be
equally suspect.
V. IMMIGRATION TRIBUNALS AND PUBLIC SAFETY
A. A History of Attention to Public Safety
Removing a discretionary jurisdictional veto might be supportable
if it could be shown either that the independent appellate body had
consistently failed to turn its mind to the question of danger to the
public in Canada, or that the question was dealt with in such a quixotic
way that a firm ministerial hand was needed to ensure conformity with
the goal. Neither position is supportable based on the history of
immigration appellate tribunals. From the start the Appeal Board took
seriously its role as judicial guardian of both individual and state
interests, evidenced by Board Chair Janet Scott's clear statement: "[that
any exercise of its equitable jurisdiction] cannot be used irresponsibly to
108 Barnes v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1995] I.A.D.D. No. 1251 (QL),
Doc. No. T95-02198 (3 November 1995) at 34 [unreported] (I.R.B.-A.D.). A search of recent cases
revealed more than a dozen such situations, in some of which the sitting member insists that the
Appeal Division retains jurisdiction.
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destroy the law."l Scott was meticulous in differentiating the Board's
discretion from that which had been exercised previously by the
minister,11 0 by virtue of the need to confine and structure it. The Board
was aware of the balancing requirement: "the evidence against the
granting of special relief is weighed on one side, the evidence for on the
other."111 In Chirwa v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration,112
decided within the first eighteen months of its mandate, it was held that
discretion "was not intended [by Parliament] to be applied so widely as
to destroy the essentially exclusionary nature of the Immigration Act and
Regulations." 113 The Board demanded proof of reasonable grounds to
justify special relief against valid deportation orders. It developed
guidelines to ensure that all aspects of a case were considered;
statutorily imposed and internally developed steps for making decisions
showed a serious commitment to its new position.114 These institutional
changes can be classified into structured approaches and structured
processes.
B. A Structured Approach
Constantly aware of the tension between the statutory goal of
ensuring public safety and the necessity of individually contextualized
justice, the Board developed an increasingly sophisticated system of
analysis by which to structure and guide their exercise of discretionary
power. Early cases counterposed the express public safety goal15 with
such factors as family considerations and the related question of
"rootedness." 116 These included indicia such as the citizenship and
109 J.V. Scott, "Speech on the Immigration Appeal Board Delivered at the Midwinter 1970
Meeting of the Canadian Bar Association " (Address to the Canadian Bar Association, Ottawa,
1970) at 17 [unpublished] [hereinafter "Speech"].
110 Ibid. at 19: "it is nothing of the kind-judicial discretion bears no relationship to
ministerial, or executive, clemency."
111 Ibid. at 23.
112 (29 May 1969) [unreported] (I.A.B.) [hereinafter Chirwa], referred to ibid. at 20.
113 "Speech," supra note 109 at 20, citing Chirwa, supra note 112.
114 Ile gravity with which the Board viewed its role as a deliberative, adversarial court earned
it criticism from some quarters, including the Law Reform Commission of Canada. See W. Janzen
& I. Hunter, "The Interpretation of Section 15 of the Immigration Appeal Board Act" (1973), 11
Alta. L. Rev. 260 at 277; and Immigration Appeal Board, supra note 106 at 61.
115 Immigration Act, supra note 1, s. 3(i).
116 Janzen & Hunter, supra note 114 at 272.
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family ties of the appellant's immediate family,117 the length of time in
Canada,118 present or future occupational prospects,1/9 and presence of
relatives in Canada1 20 Many of these criteria were developed in cases of
non-permanent residents facing deportation, given the early paucity of
permanent resident deportation appeals.1 2l
These considerations had, by the 1985 case of Ribic v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration),122 matured into an
enumerated set of criteria under which every case was examined and
weighed against the domestic interests of Canada, including safety and
public order. The criteria were: 1) the seriousness of the offence leading
to the deportation order; 2) the possibility of rehabilitation; 3) the length
of time spent in Canada and the degree to which the appellant is
established here; 4) the family in Canada and the dislocation to the
family that deportation would cause; 5) the support available to the
appellant, not only within the family but also within the community; and
6) the degree of hardship that would be caused to the appellant by the
return to his or her country of nationality.123 The factors were not
considered to be exhaustive, and the weight attached to each would vary
according to all the circumstances of the case.124
The practice of weighing these factors against each other and
against the public safety objective was reaffirmed in 1992 by the Federal
Court of Appeal in Canepa.125 It was alleged on appeal that the Appeal
Division had incorrectly asked whether it should, in these cases,
"carefully weigh the interests of Canadian society against the interests of
the individual,"126 and thereby was distracting itself in Canepa's favour
117 See Progakis v. Minister of Manpowver and Immigration (10 December 1970) [unreported]
(I.A.B.); and Agouros v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration (1970), 3 I.A.C. 40.
1 18 SeeAina v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration (1969), I.A.C. 52.
119 See Ming Lu v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration (1970), 2 I.A.C. 46.
120 In a number of early cases cited in Janzen & Hunter, supra note 114 at 273, this factor "is
especially evident in the appeals that the Board has dismissed." It seemed that the absence of
family was more of a negative factor than presence was a plus.
121 Ibid. at 263-64. The authors complain about this lack of decisions.
122 (20 August 1985), Doe. No. V-9623, [unreported] (I.A.B.) [hereinafter Ribic].
1 2 3 O'Connor v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 21 Imm. L.R. (2d)
64 at 68 (I.R.D.-A.D.).
124 Rbic, supra note 122.
125 Supra note 10.
1 2 6 Ibid. at 285.
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regarding "all the circumstances of the case." MacGuigan J.A., speaking
on behalf of the court, disagreed with the allegation:
I cannot accept that the phrase "having regard to all the circumstances of the case" means
that a tribunal should, to make such a judgment, abstract the appellant from the society in
which he lives. The statutory language does not refer only to the circumstances of the
person, but rather to the circumstances of the case. That must surely be taken to include
the person in his total context, and to bring into play the good of society as well as that of
the individual person.
127
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was later denied, which may be
taken as at least a passive vote of confidence in this approach.
It is apparent, particularly in the Canepa holding, that the
immigration appellate tribunals have a history of explicitly addressing
concerns about the safety of the public in Canada. The Ribic guidelines
and the Canepa balancing have continued to be carried out in much the
same form to the present in board hearings. This is also made plain in
that the principles are reproduced in the current public promotional
materials circulated by the Immigration and Refugee Board) 28
Further proof of the Appeal Division's specific focus on the social
impact of the appellant's criminal behaviour, and of its implications for
the Canadian public, is its willingness to allow victim evidence where
appropriate. As was stated in Muehlfellner v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration):
[V]ictim evidence as to the repercussions of an appellant's criminal act on affected victims,
including the victim's family members [may be received]. The evidence may be received in
furtherance of the objective in section 3(i) of the ImmigrationAct, to maintain and protect
the health, safety and good order of Canadian society. Such evidence is found in
pre-sentence reports or in the Court's sentencing remarks, but the Minister's
representative may also seek to call a victim to testify.12 9
There is, in fact, no evidence of which the minister could be privy
which cannot also be presented to the Appeal Division. Given the
tribunal's careful, clear and longstanding consideration of the potential
impact on society of allowing an appellant to stay in Canada, there is
little doubt such evidence would be taken into account. Thus, there is
127 Ibid. at 286 [emphasis in original.]
128 This development of providing some information to the public about how the Appeal
Division structured its discretion was posited as desirable as far back as 1976: Immigration Appeal
Board, supra note 106 at 65.
129 IAB Doc. No. 86-6401 (26 October 1988) [unreported] (I.A.B.) [hereinafter Muehlfellner],
aff'd (1990), 112 N.R. 237 (F.C.T.D.), rev'd on other grounds (1991), 11 Imm. L.R. (2d) 245
(F.C.A.). The case was referred to in N. Mawani, "Evidentiary Matters at the Immigration and
Refugee Board in an Age of Diversity" (1994) 8 Can. J. Admin. L & P. 41 at 61.
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little, if any, rationale for adding a ministerial veto to a jurisdiction in
which the minister may fully and amply present a case against a
perceived danger to the public.
C. A Structured Process
Once an appellant appears before the Division, and once the
Ribic and Canepa factors have been addressed by the appellant and the
minister, a series of threshold decisions must be made. Based on the
evidence supplied by both parties, the following questions are raised by
the Board: a) whether to grant the appeal without terms or conditions;
b) whether to grant a stay on terms and conditions; c) the length of stay;
d) what terms and conditions of stay; e) an informal issue discussion with
colleagues; f) a review by the legal department of the IRB; and g) a
general review of reasons by the Assistant Deputy Chair.
At each of these stages, any evidence led regarding an appellant's
perceived danger to the public will be considered. The first four steps
balance this evidence against the personal circumstances of the
appellant. The last three steps (which take place against the background
constraints on consultation provided by IwA v. Consolidated-Bathurst
Packaging Ltd.,130 and conform to Davis's concept of "checking"131)
ensure that in the course of making a decision, the member has had the
widest possible opportunity to turn his or her mind to all relevant
questions.
Compare this process with the minister's new opinion process. In
rendering an opinion there is no structuring. Further, it is not possible
to check the decisionmaking process, and there are no apparent
threshold decisions culminating in the final decision to veto. As far as
can be discerned, information which would have historically formed the
substance of the minister's case at the Appeal Division, is gathered in
order for a decision to be made either to negate or acknowledge the
jurisdiction of the appellate body.
D. Adjudicative Tribunal or the Minister's New Foot?
The exercise of discretion by the Appeal Division is a graduated
process in which evidence from both the appellant and the minister must
130 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 282.
131 See Davis, supra note 13, c. 1,2.
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be assessed under a number of heads, with the resultant adjudicative
facts then used in a step-by-step process to reach a decision.132 If certain
adjudicative facts are found, an appellant may be determined to be a
danger to the public in Canada, and the appeal will fail. In contrast, the
exercise of discretion by the minister undei the new statutory regime is a
binary process in which the evidence in possession of the minister either
does or does not result in a finding of legislative fact which in turn either
does or does not veto the jurisdiction of the Appeal Division.133 When
the discretion is exercised and the jurisdiction expunged, the minister's
view always prevails-by default.
If the purpose of Bill C-44 is to validate and carry out a
deportation order in the least number of steps, with the least
expenditure of effort and resources, then the amendments should be
adjudged a success. This seems to be the government's goal.
Unfortunately, when individual interests must also be in the foreground,
as required by Singh, the Charter, and the Canadian Bill of Rights134 and
by the consideration of the matrix of social and individual interests
affirmed in Canepa, different measurements apply. The yardstick for
efficiency cannot be how quickly and cheaply a policy goal can be
achieved, but must instead be how balanced and considered is a decision
that is inherently an adjudicative one.
To argue that all along the process has been ill-suited to the
adjudicative end of the spectrum, and more suited to the political end,
belies history. The fulsome participation of the minister in adducing
evidence and testing the appellant's evidence under the listed heads of
analysis is, throughout the last thirty years, incontrovertible. In that time
the minister never refused to contest an appeal, nor argued that such a
determination was not suited to the adjudicative process as structured.
Rather, the minister consistently tested evidence relating to the
individual, presented evidence relating to the individual, and argued for
facts to be found regarding the individual, each time based on evidence
"in all the circumstances of the case" supporting a decision in favour of
upholding a deportation order. There is no evidence that the minister
ever addressed, in thousands of appeals, the issue of the suitability of the
appellate, adjudicative nature of the process, which might show a need
132 For a useful explanation of adjudicative versus legislative facts, see G.A. Flick, Natural
Justice: Principles and PracticalApplication, 2d ed. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1984) c. 5 at 101.
133 Ibid.: "The practical difference between [adjudicative and legislative] categories of fact is
that ... adjudicative facts must be supported by substantial evidence whereas findings of legislative
fact frequently are not (and sometimes cannot be) supported by evidence."
134 S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III.
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for a more political form of discretion over such cases. Similarly, there
has never been a complaint about the unsuitability of addressing
individual issues according to the Ribic and Canepa criteria. 135 It all
leads to the much more likely conclusion that changing the locus of the
discretionary power is both a political and economic decision, brought
about partly by a sensationalist media. That this is true can be seen by
the different approaches to other public safety regimes, the focus of the
next part of this article.
VI. COMPARING OTHER DISCRETIONARY
PUBLIC SAFETY REGIMES
Whether public safety is under greater threat from permanent
resident criminals, potential terrorists, or dangerous offenders is a
question beyond the scope of this article. However, with the coming into
force of Bill C-44, it is timely to compare how government has dealt with
the issue of public safety in each of the above three areas. Each regime
treats the matter differently, although arguably the individual threat is
similar. In the first three sections of this part, a brief overview of the
three regimes is given. The final section compares the three, and shows
how, in two of the three regimes, the government has "hedged its bets"
in a number of ways, which is a more acceptable way to structure the
discretion than the apparently unfettered discretion conferred on the
minister by section 70 of the Immigration Act.
A. Permanent Residents Who Might "Endanger the Lives or Safety of
Persons in Canada" in a National Security Context
Sections 38.1 to 40.2 of the Immigration Act provide the basis on
which permanent residents are subject to deportation on national
security grounds. In this case, a report issued under section 27 should
include reference to a member's inadmissibility under any of paragraphs
19(1)(e)-(g) and (k) of the Act. The four provisions cover a potential
eight variations in status, including persons who:
a) have committed past acts or will commit future acts of espionage, subversion or
terrorism;
136
135 See text accompanying notes 122-128, supra.
1 3 6 Immigration Act, supra note 1, s. 19.(e), (f).
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b) will commit acts of violence in future that would or might endanger the lives or safety
of persons in Canada;13 7 or
c) are a "danger to the security of Canada" but cannot be characterized as members of
any of the classes described in subsections a) to g).38
Although permanent residents have only a qualified right to
enter or remain in Canada,139 the possession of this right merits, at least
in the national security context, a delay in deportation (referred to as a
"certificate" in theAct) until after a form of hearing. More procedural
safeguards exist for permanent residents than for non-permanent
residents. In order to commence the process, two Ministers-the
immigration and the solicitor general-must agree and report their joint
opinion to the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC),140 which
holds an investigation. SIRC is a "specialist tribunal" to whom is owed
"considerable deference ... in regard to matters of concern in relation to
security." 141
SIRC'S investigation process is not set out in the Immigration Act,
but is incorporated by reference to SIRC'S enabling legislation, the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.142 It is, in fact, the same as
sIRc's procedure for dealing with a complaint regarding a denial of a
security clearance. The hearing provisions include the necessity of
advance notice to the person,143 provision of at least a summary of the
information giving rise to the investigation, 144 and the opportunity to
make representations, present evidence and appear personally or by
counsel before the committee.1 45 In conducting the hearing, SRC's
powers are virtually identical to those of the Appeal Division in terms of
1371bid. s. 19.(1)(g).
138 Ibid. s. 19(1)(k ). This has been described as a "general security threat" provision and an
"undefined security ground" in N. Goodman, "Enforcement and Control under Bill C-86,"
[unpublished; on file with the authors].
139 Immigration Act, supra note 1, s. 38.1.
140 Ibid. s. 39(2).
141 Al Yamani v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1996] 1 F.C. 174 at 209 (T.D.) [hereinafter A/
Yamani].
142 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-9, ss. 48-51 [hereinafter csisAct]. See also lmmigration Act, supra note 1,
s. 39(5).
143 Immigration Act, supra note 1, s. 39(3).
144 Ibid. s. 39(6).
145 See csis Act, supra note 142, ss. 43, 44, 48-51. See also, Immigration Act, supra note 1, s.
39(5).
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compulsion of witnesses and widened evidentiary scope, 146 but the
process differs significantly in that it is not adversarial and there is no
right to be present, have access to, or comment on ministerial
representations to the committee.147
On completion of its investigation, SIRC in turn reports its
conclusion and reasons to the Governor in Council1 48 and its conclusion,
without reasons, to the person involved.1 49 The Governor in Council
will, if satisfied, direct the minister to issue a certificate,lSo which then
becomes conclusive proof of the subject's status, resulting in a
deportation order against that person.lSl
A limited right of appeal exists to the Appeal Division,152 solely
on a question of law or fact, or mixed law and fact. However, as the
certificate is "conclusive proof" of any allegations regarding the
permanent residentlS3 it is unclear what point of law could make an
appeal useful.154 Should an appeal to the Appeal Division already be
under way on compassionate or humanitarian grounds under section
70(3)(b), the existence of a certificate will cause it to be dismissedJSS
Although the Immigration Act is silent on the issue, subsequent recourse
to section 70(3)(b) is arguably moot as well.
B. Dangerous Offender Declarations Under the Criminal Code
Persons in Canada who have been convicted but not yet
sentenced for a "serious personal injury offence"15 6 may be subject to an
application by the Crown to have them declared a "dangerous offender."
146 cslsAc supra note 142, s. 50.
147 Ibid. s. 48(2). For a more thorough description of the SIRC investigation and hearing
process see I. Leigh, "Secret Proceedings in Canada" (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 113, especially at
159ff.
148lmmigration Act, supra note 1, s. 39(9).
149 Ibid., s. 39(10).
150 Ibid. s. 40(1).
151 Ibid. s. 32(2).
152 Ibid. s. 70(4)(a).
1 5 3 Ibid. s. 40(2).
154 See J.S. Russell, National Security in Canada: a Critical Perspective of the State's Talisman
(LLM. Thesis, University of Ottawa, 1990) [unpublished, microfiche] at 227-28.
155 Immigration Act, supra note 1, s. 82(2).
156 Criminal Code, supra note 12, s. 752.
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A successful application will result in imposition of a sentence for an
indefinite period, rather than the sentence which otherwise might have
been imposed for the offence.157 The crime must be of a certain type,
including: a) indictable offences of violence, endangerment to life or
safety, or infliction of severe psychological damage for which a sentence
of ten years may be imposed;158 and b) a sexual offence or attempted
sexual offence mentioned in section 271 of the Criminal Code. Should
the Crown exercise its discretion and attempt to have someone who has
been convicted but not yet sentenced declared a dangerous offender,
application must be made to the convicting court or a superior court
judge.159 The attorney general of the province in which the conviction
took place must consent to the application before it can be heard.1 60
Once consent has been obtained, a hearing of the application must take
place.161
Although the hearing takes place without a jury,162 there are a
number of procedural protections in place, including the provision of
prior notice to the offender, outlining the basis for the application 163 the
requirement of expert testimony of two psychiatrists, one nominated by
each party;164 and the ability of the offender to call other relevant
evidence,1 65 including evidence of character and repute.1 66 The offender
must be present at the hearing. 67  It must be established to the
satisfaction of the court that (i) the conviction is for a crime that fits the
definition of a "serious personal injury offence;" 168 and (ii) that the
offender has shown repetitive, persistent, or sufficiently brutal behaviour
connected to or associated with the offence for which he or she has been
convicted.169 Once the statutory criteria have been met, a judge cannot
15 71bid. s. 753.
158 Ibid. s. 752(a), (b).
159 Ibid. s. 753.
160 Ibid. s. 754(1)(a).
161 Ibid. s. 754.
162 Ibid. s. 754(2).
163 Ibid. s. 754(1)(b).
164 Ibid. s. 755(1).
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid. s. 757.
1 6 7 bid. s. 758.
168 Ibid. s. 752.
169 Ibid. s. 753.
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refuse to make a finding that the defendant is a dangerous offender.170
The only discretion is deciding whether to impose a sentence of
indeterminate detention.1 71
An offender does have a right of appeal, but this is limited to an
appeal of the indeterminate sentence, on any ground of law or fact, or
mixed law and fact.172 If the appeal succeeds, the court of appeal may
order a new hearing or quash the indeterminate sentence and impose a
determinate sentence suitable to the conviction.1 73 If the original
hearing failed, the Crown may also appeal, on any ground of law, and if
successful, gain another hearing. 74
C. Permanent Residents Who "Constitute a Danger
to the Public in Canada" Under Bill C-44
A full outline of the law has previously been set out in Part II,
above; added here are a few relevant observations. As already noted,
section 70(5) of the Immigration Act implies that the minister's opinion
may be issued any time the two conditions specified are fulfilled
(deportation order and within specified criminal class). However, by
appearing in the appeal section of the Act, with a specific reference
under section 70(2), it is likely that an opinion will only be issued once
an appeal has been filed under section 70, amounting to a third
condition precedent.
There also exists, in section 70(6), an alternate third condition
precedent. Where an appellant concerningwhom no opinion was issued
has been successful at the Appeal Division, and the Division has directed
a stay of the deportation order on terms and conditions, the minister
may-at any subsequent time-issue an opinion that the appellant has
breached the terms and conditions and is a danger to the public in
170 ibid. And seeR v. Moore (1985), 49 O.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.).
171 See, for example, J.D. watt & M. Fuerst, The Annotated 1995 Tremeear's Criminal Code
(Toronto: Carswell, 1995) at 1222. However, a recent amendment to the Criminal Code removed
even this discretion by dictating that a judge "shall impose" an indefinite sentence on an offender
who meets the statutory requirements of dangerous offender status: S.C. 1997, c. 17, s. 4 (creating s.
753(4)). This change in the law was enacted after this article was written, thus changing the context
in which the authors' comparisons in Part VI(D), below, can be made. However, this change does
not appear to be significant enough to vary the conclusions.
172 Criminal Code, supra note 12, s. 759(1).
173 Ibid. s. 759(3).
174 Ibid. s. 759(4).
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Canada.e7s In such an instance, section 70(6) prohibits the Appeal
Division from reviewing the case as otherwise provided for in section
74(2). There is no indication whether the minister must in these cases
arrive at two simultaneous opinions-that the conditions have been
breached and that the person is a danger. Another possible reading is
that one triggers or is linked inevitably linked to the other, that is, by
breaching a condition, a person is by definition a danger.
There are no procedural provisions or routes of appeal laid out
in subections 70(5) and (6). They simply provide exceptions to the
appeal rights otherwise provided for in section 70 of the Immigration Act.
The only possible avenue for someone about whom an opinion has been
issued would appear to be the compassionate or humanitarian
application rights under section 114(2). Such an attempt is likely futile,
in that application is being made to the same minister responsible for
issuing the opinion under subsection 70(5) or (6).176
D. Comparing the Three Schemes
There are five bases for arguing that the three schemes are
sufficiently alike to merit comparison. First, all have the express
purpose of protecting "persons" or the "public in Canada" from danger.
In other words, they are public safety provisions. Second, each provision
deals with individuals who are found to pose in some manner or other a
danger to "persons" or the "public in Canada." Third, the criteria used
to identify the potential danger posed by an individual are past or
predicted actions or omissions of individuals that have either resulted in,
or could result in, criminal convictions expected to attract sentences over
a certain threshold. Fourth, each of the three schemes must be set in
motion by an exercise of ministerial discretion. None operates
automatically by operation of law. Finally, the end result of exercising
this discretion is a separation of that danger from the public in
Canada-two through deportation, one through indefinite incarceration.
175 Immigration Act, supra note 1, s. 70(6).
176 See the arguments raised in Sedgwick, supra note 9; and the White Paper, supra note 83.
But see Williams v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1997] 2 F.C. 646 (C.A.)
[hereinafter Williams], for an alternate view (Courts are to assume that decision-makers act in good
faith-the Court implies that the minister could make a different determination upon humanitarian
and compassionate grounds): see Part VII(E), below.
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1. Procedural similarities between the national security
and dangerous offender regimes 177
In both the national security certificate and the dangerous
offender regimes, exercising ministerial discretion initiates a defined
judicial or quasi-judicial process arising from, but independent of, that
exercise of discretion. In the national security regime, two ministers
decide whether to issue a joint opinion about someone to SIRC. That
independent process requires SIRC to conduct an "investigation" with
some resemblance to a hearing. In the dangerous offender regime, the
attorney general may apply to the convicting court or a judge of a
superior court prior to an offender being sentenced. This requires a
judge (without jury) to conduct an application hearing.
Procedural features common to both regimes include: prior
notice of the hearing 78 with some indication of the basis for it; the
opportunity to appear and participate in person or by counsel at the
hearing; the opportunity to lead evidence; a wider, loosened evidentiary
standard guided by the principle of adjudged relevance; and the power
of the decisionmaker to compel and swear witnesses. Both
decisionmakers have some level of expertise within the field-siRc in
security affairs, the convicting judge in criminal matters.
Beyond these features, there are other similarities of a structural
nature. In both regimes, a check against possible arbitrary
decisionmaking is provided by requiring double agreement for the
implementation of the discretionary decision. In the national security
instance, the minister of immigration and the solicitor general must both
agree to issue an opinion. In the case of dangerous offender
applications, the application may not proceed without the agreement of
the Crown and the relevant provincial attorney general. Although the
close working relationships of the respective ministries may lessen its
impact, there is still some check against excess available through such a
process.
In addition, if the original act of discretion succeeds at the
hearing stage, the next Davis-like check on it is that the result is subject
to a second, differently-located discretion (albeit of an arguably more
pro forma nature). In the national security case, the SIRC conclusion and
177 For the sake of argument here, we are ignoring the glaring differences which exist as well,
not least among them the immediacy of Charter concerns in the criminal context in contrast with the
seeming immunity from Charter scrutiny of the national security scheme.
178 For the sake of economy, both are referred to as a hearing, despite the differences
manifest in the siRc "investigation."
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reasons are submitted to the Governor in Council before directing the
minister to issue a certificate. Similarly, a presiding judge in a dangerous
offender application-if required to declare someone a dangerous
offender-may still decide whether or not to sentence the offender to an
indefinite term.
Both schemes evidence at least a nominal nod in the direction of
some presumptive rights on behalf of the individual. In dangerous
offender applications, the Crown must satisfy the evidentiary burden;
while at SIRC, evidence might result in a negative finding on the
ministers' initial report.
Once a decision has been taken, appeal rights do exist, although
limited in scope. Once a national security certificate has been issued
concerning a permanent resident, questions of law, fact, or mixed law
and fact may be appealed to the Appeal Division. A dangerous offender
may appeal the order of an indeterminate sentence, although not the
designation giving rise to it. The likelihood of success in either case may
be minimal. However, an essential point is that the mere existence of
these rights places events initiated by acts of ministerial discretion back
into the adjudicative mainstream.
2. Bill C-44 amendments and the other two regimes
The recent amendments to the ImmigrationAct evince significant
differences when compared with the two other discretion-initiated
regimes. The Bill C-44 regime is at least similar to the national security
arrangement in that in both it is unclear precisely what motivates the
initial exercise of ministerial discretion. All three, it is suspected, are
largely products of media attention to particular cases. However,
beyond this passing similarity, any resemblance to the other two regimes
breaks down. By beginning and ending in the exercise of the minister's
discretion, the Bill C-44 regime is unique.
Procedurally, the Bill C-44 regime provides neither coherent
discretionary structure nor adequate checking. There is no notice.
There is no hearing of any kind (in fact, the point of the exercise is
exactly the opposite-to remove the chance of a hearing). Thus, there is
no opportunity to lead evidence or hear or respond to any part of the
adversary's case. At no stage is there a requirement to consult with
another executive member. Moreover, there is no breathing space
created by being subjected, however perfunctorily, to a second
discretion, and there is no way to step back from the process once the
exercise of discretion has started it rolling.
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What is most remarkable about these differences is that there is
such a paucity of detail concerning how the minister's discretion
operates, and no provision for anything deriving from the discretion
once it has been exercised. In this, the Bill C-44 regime seems to be of a
very different type from the other two regimes. It is, in its lack of
explicative detail and absence of any kind of external involvement in
making the decision, much more an exercise in absolute discretion. This
is made even more apparent in its curious inclusion of two other variants
of absolute discretion-one of which simply strips away appeal rights,
the other which nullifies them by intruding after existing appeal rights
have been successfully exercised. Ultimately, the process is pure
discretion with no objectifying factors.
In terms of the normative criteria set out in Part III, above, the
national security and dangerous offender regimes both exhibit some
rationality. Both are exercises of discretion that are later grounded in
separate adjudicative processes. Both have contextualizing machinery
that help to both structure and check the initial exercise of discretion.
It is, of course, impossible to disentangle the exercise of
discretion in any of these regimes from the dictates of policy. In all
three, individual interests conflict with government policy. What is clear,
though, is that in comparing these three attempts to achieve a similar
policy goal, the Bill C-44 regime is alone in failing to even appear to
protect individual rights. The result is a move toward direct political
control of individual justice. Resembling both the national security and
the dangerous offender regimes in the location of discretion, the
"opinion" regime lacks even their nominal protection of the interests of
the individual. Further, the role of the Federal Court (Trial Division),
by way of review, is rendered toothless, as the unstructured nature of the
discretion gives little for it to grip.179 Why then do we have the
appearance of such legislation now, in the face of historical antipathy,
and other schemes that deal more responsibly with a similar problem?
What will this mean for permanent resident status? These are the
concerns of the next part.
179 See Part VII(C), below.
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VII. BILL C-44: WHITHER RATIONALITY, PURPOSIVENESS,
AND MORALITY?
A. Role of Public Outcry in Forming Legislation
In the year preceding the introduction of Bill C-44 several crimes
were committed by persons who had been successful in obtaining stays of
their deportation orders from the IAD appeal process. 8 0 Subsequent
media coverage made much of the fact that the perpetrators of these
crimes had been ordered deported but were still in Canada by virtue of
stays granted by the Appeal Division. In response to one of the crimes,
then-Immigration Minister Sergio Marchi stated that in the cases of
those perpetrators, the immigration process had failed and let down the
Canadian people. He promised quick remedial action, which was
delivered in the form of Bill C-44. In his statement to the House of
Commons on 1 November 1994, he opined that the Bill "provides fair
access and ensures the rule of law," and was the result of a "loss of
confidence in the immigration program's ability ... to enforce the
Immigration Act against those who have been ordered removed." The
avowed goal of the measures was to seek "to restore Canadians'
confidence and thus contribute to this Government's broader goal of
creating safe streets and safe homes."181  While this and similar
pronouncements182 may be considered, charitably, populist restatements
of one of the objectives of the Immigration Act,183 they fail to indicate
that the Immigration Appeal Division had, in reviewing these same
180 These included the 1994 shotgun slaying of a young woman customer, Vivi Leimonis,
during a robbery in the "Just Desserts" cafr in Toronto, and the murder of a police officer, Todd
Bayliss, during an attempted drug arrest in June 1994. Each received extensive media coverage
across Canada.
181 Hon. S. Marchi, "Statement to the House of Commons on Tabling of the Strategy and the
Immigration and Citizenship Plan" (1 November 1994) at 7 [unpublished]; available on the LN.I.M
database in QuickLaw, document 4.
182 See Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Into the 21st Century:A Strategy
for Immigration and Citizenship (Hull: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1994) at xiii: "[T1
prevent the misuse of the refugee protection system by serious criminals." See also Canada,
Department of Citizenship and Immigration, A Broader Vision: Immigration and Citizenship Plan
1995-2000 Annual Report to Parliament (Hull: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1994); and
Hon. S. Marchi, "Speaking Notes for House of Commons" (2 March 1995) [unpublished]: "Bill
C-44 ... will give us the tools to help fix a problem with a criminal few who would subvert our
system."
183 See Immigration Act, supra note 1, s. 3(i): "to maintain and protect the health, safety and
good order of Canadian society."
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cases, also been guided by that objective-as was required under the
Canepa judgment.184
It is another irony, among many, that neither a balancing of
interests under the Canepa criteria, nor an exercise of the minister's new
negative discretion, will prevent the possibility that some permanent
resident in Canada under a stayed deportation order will commit a
further crime. Unless an opinion is issued, ending a huge majority of
deportation appeals, can the minister achieve anything more via the new
shotgun approach, than the iAD does by taking the same evidence and
factors into consideration? Further, unless the minister intends to
render an opinion for every section 70 appeal (or catch them later under
a breach of condition), then some section 70 appeals will go forward and
may succeed at the IAD on "equitable" grounds. There can never be
certainty that the non-offence rate will be 100 per cent. The only
rational way to achieve the stated goal would be to .have ousted the
jurisdiction of the Appeal Division entirely. This would, however, have
obliterated a procedural acknowledgment recognizing a permanent
resident's qualified right to remain in the country. 85
Attention to public opinion, even if fuelled by capricious media
coverage, can hardly be considered an irrational consideration for a
politician. It is irrational, however, if it is used as the primary
consideration for making specific alterations to a statutory framework,
without due regard to the framework as a whole and the larger legal
framework within which the statute operates. In this case, the
Immigration Act, the Charter, and the common law all have parts to play.
B. Is PoliticalAccountability a Sufficient Safeguard?
One argument that is made is that ministers are politically
accountable, and that accountability will operate sufficiently as a
safeguard against arbitrary exercise of a discretion. In fact, the
amendments themselves, enacted duly as a response to a perceived
problem, can be seen as an exercise of political accountability. This
argument is fallacious. Although the public did indeed express-
unhappiness with a system that allowed criminals under deportation
orders to remain in the country, nothing in that public response dictated
that the minister needed to reclaim a jurisdiction from the IAD; the
public outcry could just as well have been interpreted as a call to revamp
18 4 See text accompanying notes 123-128, supra.
185 Ibid. s. 4(2).
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the IAD. It could have been interpreted as a call to institute procedures
along the lines of the national security or dangerous offender regimes, or
some entirely new solution. In any event, it is always advisable to
diagnose a problem before attempting a solution.
Moreover, as Davis and Galligan have observed, too much is
made of political accountability, in that it is not as fine a tool as
credited.18 6 Barring truly egregious actions that might cause a particular
minister's removal (but still leaving the statutory regime intact), such
accountability is too infrequent. An arbitrary exercise of discretion
against an individual three or four years in the past might or might not
be remembered at election time and would be jumbled together with all
the other election considerations anyway. In the case of this particular
discretion, its arbitrary exercise against a permanent resident places the
subject outside the country, an oubliette from which it would generally be
difficult to drag up a cause cglbre. The failure of the minister to
exercise the discretion merely gives the appellant permanent resident an
opportunity to be heard by the iAD, but no guarantee of remaining in the
country. Should, however, a notorious crime be committed subsequently
by a successful appellant, the minister is partially insulated from direct
accountability by pointing to the iAD's positive decision in any event. It
is thus difficult to see how political accountability justifies a change as
fundamental as this.
There is a final argument against the efficacy of political
accountability. If a political decision is unpopular, notions of
accountability may come into play, subject to the doubts expressed
above. However, when a political decision is made that panders to
public opinion-however much it might violate or discount the
importance of individual interests-then the safeguard of political
accountability breaks down. This can be seen in the example of the use
of executive action to "roll back" many of the tenets of procedural
fairness which occurred in the prison cases.187 The idea that political
accountability acts as a brake in these situations is not believable.
C. Justiciability
A judgment rendered by the IAD on an appeal, as it may be
subject to judicial review under section 82.1(1)(1), is clearly more
justiciable than a minister issuing an opinion. There is no requirement
186 See generally supra note 13.
18 7 See Martineau, supra note 105; and Cardinal, supra note 105.
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that the minister give reasons for section 70(5) opinions, and the record
consists of only the adjudicator's findings giving rise to the deportation
order.188 Opinions delivered under section 70(6) will be even more
problematic on review. In such a case, the reviewing court will be in the
unenviable position of assessing two separate and conflicting exercises of
discretion-by the IAD, for the appellant, and by the minister, against.
Of concern is also the question of expertise in the standard of
review. Although the LAD is not overtly a tribunal of specialists, in
accumulating thirty years of collective experience, the IAD can claim to
be a "specialist" panel of a sort. Contrast this with the fact that the
minister of immigration is not a specialist-unlike the solicitor general
or attorney general of a province- 89 -on dangers to the public. Further,
as there is no back-up or confirmation, as in the national security or
dangerous offender regimes,190 there is no recourse to any specialist
expertise. Finally, if attempts are made to avoid this issue by
characterizing the minister's opinion as a policy decision, the wide
deference that is given to these forms of decisionmaking will give rise to
legitimate concerns over individual rights.l91
D. Comparing Terrorists and Criminals
The amended Immigration Act now provides greater procedural
protections for permanent residents who are allegedly terrorists, war
criminals, or who have committed crimes against humanity than it does
for those whom the minister considers dangerous to public safety on the
basis of certain criminal criteria. Those greater procedural protections
represent a minimum dictated by the requirements of the statute
(permanent resident's qualified right to remain), the common law
(requirement of a certain level of natural, if not fundamental, justice
when rights or interests of an individual are at stake), and the unresolved
188 This procedure was confirmed as valid in Williams, supra note 176.
189 These ministers are regarded as such because they exercise discretion under the national
security provisions or the dangerous offender provisions of the Criminal Code. See Part VI, above.
190 This was discussed in Part VI, above.
191 See Canada (A.G.) v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735 [hereinafter Inuit
Tapirisat]. Arguably, the kind of decision at issue in Inuit Tapirisat is very different from a
ministerial decision relating to an individual pursuant to section 70 of the Immigration Act. In any
case, even if the "policy" label is invoked, one might query whether or to what extent deference is
due when Charter rights are at stake. See, for example, Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R., [1985] 1
S.C.R. 441.
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boundary of Charter application.1 92 In forming a rational, purposive and
moral legislative response to public concern over certain criminal
incidents, the minister would have been well advised to take into account
such considerations. This is especially true given that, in the past, equal
public concern and media attention have been focused on the other
public safety classes of terrorists and dangerous offenders. While the
amendments ostensibly reflect a strong response to a serious public
concern, they ignore the implications inherent in a permanent resident's
qualified right to. remain, or the procedures established in the other
regimes for ousting such a right.
E. Purely Administrative Deportation?
The waters are also muddied by delineating a set of criminal
criteria and linking deportation to criminality, within a statutory context
which maintains that deportation is not a criminal sanction. Under the
amended procedure, a minister's opinion leads inexorably to
deportation. Despite the Federal Court of Appeal's statement in
Williams 93 that a person has recourse to compassionate and
humanitarian grounds under section 114(2), an opinion strips not just
the jurisdiction of the Appeal Division, but as we argued in Part V(B),
above, also effectively forecloses the underlying informal route of
section 114(2) because it becomes an application to the same opinion-
issuing minister. Moreover, an opinion issued against someone who has
violated terms and conditions and is a danger1 94 means that a previously
successful appellant can subsequently be removed without recourse.
That is, the IAD may find sufficient equitable reasons for an appellant not
to be removed, even considering public safety, but the minister may
unilaterally declare that appellant to have violated a condition and be a
danger. In either case, deportation is linked to the characteristic of
criminality, identified by an adjudicator at first instance. It is difficult to
see how removal of a permanent resident, resulting from either criminal
conviction or potential conviction, falls so clearly outside the boundaries
of criminal sanction as to remain insulated from the heightened
procedural and Charter protections it would otherwise invoke. Only a
192 Sopinka J. left this as an open question in Chiarelli, supra note 81.
1 9 3 Supra note 176.
19 4 Immigration Act, supra note 1, s. 70(6).
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very narrow reading of fundamental justice rulings such as Singh95 can
maintain such an artifice.
F. Specific Section 70(6) Problems
Several particularly problematic situations arise under the
specific provision allowing a minister to issue an opinion against an
appellant who has been successful at the IAD where the appellant has
broken terms or conditions of the stay. First, if, as typically occurs, a
condition of "no criminal fraternization" has been imposed, and if the
permanent resident then attends self-help meetings with such groups as
Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous (or even adult
education classes) at which another person convicted of a crime is
present, that person becomes vulnerable to the minister's new discretion.
Similarly, those who inadvertently fail to notify the ministry that their
address has changed (a common reporting condition), or, even less
glaring, have such notice go astray or be delayed through no fault of
their own, are at risk. Transforming such events into the equivalent of a
strict liability offence, subject to the possible and final sanction of an
opinion, speaks particularly against this branch of the minister's new
discretion.
Second, the nature of the finding is substantively different in the
case of a section 70(6) opinion. A ministerial opinion that a person has
broken a term or condition of his or her stay is a question of fact which is
capable of specific determination. As a finding of fact, that species of
minister's opinion should be reviewable, as specified in Singh, on a
different standard. In these cases, the standard can only be met through
an oral hearing.
G. Potential Fettering of the lAD's Operation
For those appeals in which the IAD is allowed to exercise its
jurisdiction, the new amendments cannot help but operate as a
constraint on its ability and/or willingness to allow an appeal with a stay.
The subsequent vulnerability to ministerial discretion and the potential
195 Supra note 79.
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for embarrassment are simply too great.196 Independent agencies are
not immune from political or public pressure. For one thing, no one
wants to be pilloried in the press or by neighbours for one's actions; for
another, terms of appointment expire all too quickly. Such factors may
push the IAD towards reaching more negative decisions on appeal.
Richard Lempert has described this fettering process as an agency
"systematically constrain[ing] its so-called discretionary decisions in a
particular direction."197 If the iAD does allow itself to be fettered by the
fear of subsequent ministerial "correction," the net result is a further
erosion, or even extinguishing, of the iAD's equitable discretion.
H. Possible Increase in Evasion
Another potential impact of the amendments will be to force
persons considered dangerous (but not in custody) to avoid the appeal
system entirely. The only lawful way to remain in Canada can be
foreclosed if a person files an appeal and in doing so stimulates a
minister's opinion. There appears to be little reason for any non-
detained section 70 potential appellant to take that chance, since even
having done so and succeeded, they are still subject to a ministerial
opinion under section 70(6). A certain number may opt to go
underground instead. This could then shrink the number of appeals,
which could affect the nature and capability of the Appeal Division. In
any case, the likely rise in tension between the minister and the LAD can
only serve to create further uncertainties and inefficiencies in a system
19 6 The Law Reform Commission of Canada has described this desire for "political approval":
This can result in confusion as to the criteria to be followed by the agency. For example,
the agency, in reaching its decision, is likely to be influenced by its perception of what will
meet with approval. ... [The agency may be forced to draw inferences about government
policy from insufficiently explained reactions to its prior decisions.
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Independent Administrative Agencies: A
FrameworkforDecision Making (Report No. 26) (Ottawa: The Commission, 1985) at 39 [hereinafter
LRCC Report No. 26]. See also Law Reform Commission of Canada, Independent Administrative
Agencies (Working Paper No. 25), (Ottawa: The Commission, 1985). In our view, this is a form of
what could be termed "internal regulatory capture"--worth researching further, but outside the
scope of this article. For an explanation of regulatory or agency capture see P.J. Quirk, Industry
Influences in Federal Regulatory Agencies (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1981).
197 R. Lempert, "Discretion in a Behavioral Perspective: the Case of a Public Housing
Eviction Board" in Hawkins, ed., supra note 64, 185 at 226.
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the minister has acknowledged has a tenuous hold on public
confidence.198
VIII. CONCLUSION
We must not make a scarecrow of the law,
Setting it up to fear the birds ofprey,
And let it keep one shape, till custom make it
Their perch and not their terror.
My business in this state
Made me a looker-on here in Vienna,
Where I have seen corruption boil and bubble
Till it o'errun the stew; laws for all faults,
But faults so countenanced that the strong statutes
Stand like the forfeits in a barber's shop,
As much in mock as mark.
-Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act II.i & Act V.i
In its most abstract form, the question comes down to whether a
politically accountable body exercising discretion in an opaque way or a
quasi-judicial body exercising discretion in an open and transparent
manner, is better suited to protecting the interests of individuals within
the policy goals of the immigration regime. This article has argued that
open and structured discretion is preferable. Returning discretionary
power to the minister, which has previously been condemned as having
no rational basis, is a throwback to a less enlightened era. Political
accountability alone cannot seem to bear the weight of a decision to
relocate discretion in the minister, since a four or five year review is far
too blunt and unbalanced an instrument to carve out individual justice in
individual cases.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada, in its 1985 study of
independent administrative agencies, observed that "[p]oliticians appear
to be torn between two poles, insisting on the benefits of independent
extra-departmental decisionmaking, while looking for ways to influence
it."199 The imposition of the amendments introduced by Bill C-44 and
the consequent discretionary jurisdictional veto granted to the minister
198 See citations to pronouncements from Hon. S. Marchi, supra notes 181-182.
199 See LRCC Report No. 26, supra note 196 at 7.
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would seem to be a classic example of this. One of the reasons identified
by the Law Reform Commission for establishing independent agencies
was the "desire to divert the responsibility for the resolution of
politically sensitive issues," 200 which was evident in the 1967 maturation
of the Immigration Appeal Board. Curiously, it seems that the
immigration minister has now gone against this trend. By re-seizing
discretion to prevent some permanent residents from being heard or
considered on appeal, the minister is virtually dictating an outcome
without establishing any new problems to resolve. This disproportionate
executive response is out of keeping with the need to attend, in some
manner, to an individual's legitimate interest. It ignores other regimes
where the executive has constructed a response which better addresses
those individual rights. The result is a system that is as fundamentally
wrong as it was in its first incarnation prior to 1967. It is to be hoped
that its flaws will be its downfall-either through further amendment, or
through a court willing to address the difficult constitutional, as well as
social and political, issues.
200 kid. at 5.
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